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The answers are in the future. What new legislation the Congres3 may enact
in the name of general welfare no one may guess. One may venture into the
field of conjecture, however, to state that as Congress seeks to expand its
sphere of domination, the courts will move to let down their self-made barrier
of "political question" and will take it upon themselves to decide the validity
of Congressional "general welfare" legislation in a correspondingly wider field.
It is submitted that the true worth of the courts as a check upon ill-advised
legislation is thus demonstrated. The stabilizing influence of judicial decision
will be necessary before a valid limitation upon the terms "general welfare of
the United States" can be determined.
INN IEP'S RIGHT To EXCLUDE OR EJECT GusTs.-The duty of inn-
keepers to accommodate and serve all applicants, while unrecognized by the
Roman Law,' has for centuries been affirmed and enforced in England2 and
America.3 Though expressed as a universal obligation it is not without its
limitations. To better understand the situations wherein the proprietor of a
hotel may refuse the hospitality of his house or eject a patron who has been
admitted, they will be viewed in the perspective of our tenuous knowledge
regarding the genesis of this singular duty. No precise statement of the reasons
which evoked this law is found in the early cases themselves and a departure
from the decisions leaves the investigator groping in the mists of antiquity.
Origin of Public Service Duty
Monopoly has been pointed. to as the parent of this public service duty. It
is argued that necessity for a service brought upon those dispensing it a duty
to serve the public, and that the division of business into public and private
was based on economic grounds.4 This argument is attacked on the ground
that the cases establishing the obligation make no allusion to monopoly.5 In
fact, historical evidence shows that while common surgeons, barbers, and
victuallers were under the obligation of indiscriminate service, there were
numerous practitioners in these trades.6 Moreover, not the innkeeper, but the
common innkeeper, was regarded as a public servant.7
1. 3 ScoTr, Tmm CIVIL LAw (1932) 134; RADn, Ro " LAw (1927) § 94.
2. Anonymous, Keilwey 50, p1. 4, 72 Eng. Reprints 203 (K. B. 140); Gordon v.
Silber 25 Q. B. D. 491 (1890); 3 Br. Coistf. *164.
3. Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837); State v. Steele, 105
N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478'(1890); see L. E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 754, 60
S. W. (2d) 32, 34 (1933).
Some states have incorporated the common law rule of indiscriminate service into
their statutes. GA. CoDE (1933) § 52-103; ILL. Rrv. SrT.%. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38,
§ 125; CONSTTUiON AND STATTS or LouISAA (1920) § 457; DIP. Rmr. STr. (1930) c.
36, § 5; Nm. Co . STAT. (1929) § 23-101; N. Y. CnV7L RImnrs Lw.' (1935) § 40;
OHIo Gm,. CODE (Page, 1926) § 12940.
4. 1 WvAx, PuBlic SERvicE ConOaOATios (1911) § 1; Arterburton, The Origin and
First Test of Public Callings (1927) 75 U. or Pa. L. REv. 411.
5. Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HInv. L. R'. 135, 156 n. 76.
6. See id., at 155, n. 76. It is here pointed out that in the town of Beverley barbers
and surgeons were numerous enough to impose taxes on others entering it.
7. Adler, supra, note 5, at 156, n. 76. The necessity of alleging that the inn was "corn-
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It would seem, therefore, that it was not the nature of the service, but the
extent of the undertaking that determined the public or private character of a
business. The explanation finding most support is that the legal duty to serve
all was the result of a voluntary assumption of the public service obligation.8
One who entered an occupation and professed to serve people indiscriminately,
held himself out as ready to accommodate all, and came under judicial com-
pulsion to abide by his undertaking. As soon as a man dedicated his business
to the service of the public, he waived his privilege of discrimination. Lending
strength to this view is the early development of actions on the case. An
assumpsit and its breach were generally vital elements of this proceeding.9 It
was indispensible that an allegation of assumpsit be pleaded. But suits against
persons in common callngs formed a distinct exception. Actions on the case
for refusal to serve were maintained against them without an averment of
assumpsit.10 This relaxation of procedure has been interpreted to mean that
an allegation that the defendant was engaged in a common calling was an
implied declaration that he had assumed to serve all.11 Thus by a person in
a common calling was meant simply one who held himself out as ready to
serve all.'
2
With changing economic conditions, it became more usual for persons to hold
themselves out to serve the public generally in all kinds of commercial activity.
A "holding out" lost the distinctive significance it formerly possessed. Dedi-
cation no longer was the sole progenitor of the public service duty; now it
sprang from public profession of a service affected with a public interest.13
mon" is shown in Mason v. Grafton, Hobart 245, 80 Eng. Reprint 391 (K. B. 1725). It
is therb said that a house is domus not hospitiurn if it be not commune.
8. Anonymous, 2 Rolle 345, 81 Eng. Reprints 842 (K. B. 1623) (action for refusal to
serve lies against innkeeper "because he hath subjected himself to keep a common Inn.");
2 KENT'S COMM. (10th ed. 1860) *599; Burdick, Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public
Service Companies (1911) 11 CoL.. L. R1v. 514, 515, 516; Adler, Business Jurisprudence
(1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 135, 151-4. "Also, if an innkeeper . . . hangs out a sign and
opens his house for travelers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who
travel that way; and upon this universal assumpsit an action . . . will lie against him
... if he without good reason refuses to admit a traveler." 3 Br,. CoaI~M. *164.
9. Anonymous (1441), WYMAN (1909) CASES ON PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. 1, a famous
case where right of action against horse docter denied in absence of allegation that the
doctor expressly assumed to cure the plaintiff's horse; AmEs, LECTURES oN LEGAL 1-hsTonv
(1913) 130.
10. HoLamis, THE ComaoN LAw 184; 3 BL. Comm *164.
11. Burdick, The Origin of Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (1911) 11 COL,
L. Rav. 514.
12. The obligation to serve all was incident not only to innkeepers but to all of the
"common" tradesmen and sevants. A tradesman or seivant was "common" If he professed
to serve all. STORY, BAILMENTS (9th ed. 1878) § 494; 2 KENT'S Co MA. (14th ed. 1896)
*599. Even in the development of American public utility law "dedication" has been
regarded as the paramount consideration in deciding whether a business is "public" and
therefore subject to price regulation. "A business or property in order to be affected with
a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has
been devoted to a public use and its use thereby, in effect, granted to the public". Tyson
v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 434 (1926).
13. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (1911) 11
COL. L. REv. 514, 522.
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The liability of the common surgeon, and the common farrier grew obsolete,
but as to carriers and innkeepers the duty of coercive service was continued.
Herein is visible the effect of a public policy favoring the ever growing numbers
of merchants and travelers.' 4 To insure the unhampered flow of commerce,
carriers were compelled to transport all goods; and, to assure shelter and re-
freshment to the weary wayfarer, it was imperative that the law continue the
hotelkeeper's obligation to furnish refreshment and lodging indiscriminately
to all.
Solicitude for the traveler could not, however, preclude consideration for the
safety and comfort of the patrons already in the hotel, nor could the law fail
to take cognizance of the proprietor's expectancy of compensation, and the
space limitations of the inn. To enforce service inflexibly for all might easily
transform the inn from a haven of shelter to a house of spoliation; from a
resort for rest, to a -place of tumult.
Exceptions have been made, and the situations wherein an innkeeper has
been given the right of excluding or ejecting patrons will now be presented.
ExCLUSION
Non-Traveler
A hotel proprietor may refuse to accept one who is not a traveer.'5 In the
early days when the duty to serve arose solely from the profession of public
service, the right to exclude a non-traveler was apparent, since the innkeeper
undertook to serve only the wayfaring class 10 His duty was co-extensive with
his profession. As the element of public interest became a determinant of the
common calling, limitation of the obligation to travelers was justified by the
fact that inns are a real necessity only to travelers. There are compelling
reasons why the keeper of a hotel should be forced to give lodging and food
to a weary traveler, away from home, and in dire need of rest and refreshment,
but none why others should be so favored. Today, traveler is not synonymous
with journeyer. It is not essential that a person should have come from a
distance1 7 So long as one resides away from the inn, whether far or near,
and comes to it for transient entertainment, he is a traveler and entitled to
accommodations.' s A neighbor or a townsman has as much right to admission
as a foreigner.' 9 The essence of a "traveler" under this rule is that he comes
14. See id., at 523.
15. Kisten v. Hildebrand, 43 Ky. 72, 4S Am. Dec. 416 (183); Homer v. Harvey, 3
N. M. 307, 5 Pac. 329 (13s5); Calye's Case, 3 Co. 32a, 77 Eng. Rcprints 520 (K. B.
1534); Rex v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445, 8S Eng. Reprints 1441 (K. B. 1701).
16. Wyman, The Inherent Limitation of the Public Sence Duty to Particular Clarles
(1910) 23 HIARv. L. Rmv. 339. See Hill v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tn. 376, 379, 136
S. W. 997, 998 (1911).
17. See Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 6, 22 N. W. 325, 826 (1SS5); Scnourm, Bmn-
.-r A. m CApxxExs § 280.
18. Orchard v. Bush & Co. [1893] 2 Q. B. 234.
19. Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 106 Eng. Reprints 667 (K. B. 1820); Walling
v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868); see Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Low.e, 28 Neb. 239, 246,
44 N. W. 226, 227 (1889); Roberts v. Case Hotel Co. Inc., 106 Misc. 431, 435, 175 N. Y.
Supp. 123, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1919), BaIE, NKEmEERS .ND HOTELS (1906) § 63; Vyman,
1938]
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for transient entertainment."
Inability or Refusal to Pay in Advance
Nor is a hostler obliged to put trust in his guests for payment. He may
insist on payment in advance, 2' and may exclude one who is incapable22 or
unwilling to pay. An action based on refusal to admit is defective if it fails
to allege tender of pre-payment, or circumstances excusing a failure.23 Thus,
where a proprietor does not demand payment in advance as a condition for
admitting a guest, the failure to make a tender is justified.24 Likewise, tender
is excused where it is made impossible, for example, by keeping the doors
bolted.
25
The fact that the guest is accompanied by baggage does not give him the
right to forego tender in advance. The inconvenience and the hazards of rely-
ing on baggage as the sole security make it desirable that the innkeeper be
permitted to insist on money. Of course, the right to demand payment does
not mean the right to set an arbitrary price. The host may impose only reason-
able terms, for were he permitted to charge what he pleased, he could nullify
anyone's right to be received by* calling for a prohibitive amount 20 Further-
more, payment in advance cannot be demanded for more than one day's service.
A bill for entertainment at a hotel accrues from day to day, and just as the
day is the unit of charge, so it is the limit of the innkeeper's demand.2 7
The Inherent Limitation of the Public Service Duty to Particular Classes (1910) 23 HAav.
L. REv. 339, 341. But see Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. 268, 89 Eng. Reprint 566 (K. B.
1691) (innkeepers compellable to lodge strangers) (italics inserted); BEALE, INxNEEERs
AND HOTELS (1906) § 63 (in general one living in same town not traveller); SToRY, BAL-
mETns (9th ed. 1878) § 477; WANDELL, LAW OF INNS, HOTELS AND BOARDINO HOUSE
(1888) 56 (affirming that under old law neighbor had no action as guest).
20. Petit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912); Brains v. Briggs, 272 Mich,
38, 260 N. W. 785 (1935); see Curtis v. MIurphy, 63 Wis. 4, 6, 22 N. W. 825, 826 (1885);
ScnouLmi, BAIMLENT AND CARRIRS (3d ed. 1897) § 280. Where a man breaks up his
home and goes to a hotel in the same town he clearly intends to "reside" there and is a
boarder, not a guest. Meacham v. Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. 859 (1899). Like-
wise an employee of a railroad who stops at each end of the trip at a hotel rented by the
month has been held not a guest. He is a "citizen of the community at both ends of the
route." Homer v. Harvey, 3 N. M. 307, 5 Pac. 329 (1885).
21. Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 151 Eng. Reprints 1039 (Ex. 1841); see Pinchon's
Case, 9 Co. 86b, 87b, 77 Eng. Reprint 861 (K. B. 1611); Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D.
484, 488 (1878); 18 HALSBuxy's LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1935) § 198.
22. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 528 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837); Thompson
v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 287, 106 Eng. Reprint 667, 668 (K, B. 1820). Criminal puni.h-
ment is prescribed for one who gains admission on the false pretense that he can pay.
Moreover, a false and fictitious showing of baggage is made presumptive evidence of
fraudulent intent. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1923) § 925. For a discussion of the statute see
N. Y. L. J., Sept. 6, 1938, p. 566, col. 1.
23. Fell v. Knight, 8 M. &. W. 269, 151 Eng. Reprints 1039 (Ex. 1841).
24. Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213, 173 Eng. Reprint 94 (N. P. 1835).
25. See Fell v. Knight, 8 M. &. W. 269, 276, 151 Eng. Repints 1039, 1042 (Ex. 1841).
26. See Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 211 N. Y. 465, 467, 105 N. E. 656 (1914);
BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HoTELS (1906) § 57.
27. BEALE, INNK:EEPERS AND HOTE.S (1906) § 244. Inasmuch as the total charge for
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Time and Space Limitations
The time of arrival is no justification for refusal to accept a traveler. In
larger cities, where someone is in attendance throughout the night, no problem
is presented. But in small-town, family-managed inns the arrival of a guest
while the family slumbers must occur with distressing frequency. While the
keeper of a hotel may close it at late hours of the night, one reaching it has
the right to wake the host and insist on admission. 5 To spare him this brief
discomfort and to abandon a weary traveler to the mercy of the night would
be uncivilized. The later the arrival, the more urgent is the need for shelter.
Lack of room has always been a complete justification for rejection.- This
excuse is often falsely given by innkeepers when a guest, undesirable but
entitled to admission, presents himself. Such misrepresentation is actionable.,O
And there is a presumption that room does exist, so that a complaint need not
allege the existence of available space.3 ' An inn is "full" when all the bed
chambers are occupied. An applicant has no right to demand that he be
allowed to pass the night in a parlor, nor can he ask to share the room of
another 3 2 Whether an innkeeper would be compelled to tax the capacity of
his house under extreme conditions, such as severe storms or large crowds
converging on a small town, has not been answered by the cases. Inasmuch
as a hostler is not bound beyond the extent to which he professes to accom-
modate the public, it would seem that the extent of his profession is the sole
measure of his duty, regardless of external exigencies. Thus when the chambers
dedicated to the public are occupied, an innkeeper has fulfilled his undertaking.
There is no compulsion to expand the facilities of an inn, but only to exhaust
the existing ioom by accepting guests indiscriminately. 3
any day cannot be forseen, how can a hotel proprietor obtain payment in advance? Surely,
he could not insist on a deposit large enough to cover probable charges. Expedency seems
to point one way. Some expenses are absolute and certain. Payment for thee may be
required before admission is granted. Other charges depend entirely on the numbhr of
services used by the guest. Before any such service is given, payment may be required,
but until that time no-prepayment can be asked.
28. Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213, 173 Eng. Reprints 94 (N. P. 1335).
29. White's Case, 2 Dyer 158b, 73 Eng. Reprints 343 (K. B. 1558); see Bennett v.
Mellor, 5 T. R. 273, 275, 101 Eng. Reprints 154, 155 (K. B. 1793); M dawar v. Grand
Hotel Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 11, 20.
30. White's Case, 2 Dyer 158b, 73 Eng. Reprints 343 (K. B. 1558); sce Bennett v.
Mellor, 5. T. R. 273, 275, 101 Eng. Reprints 154, 155 (K. B. 1793).
31. Jackson v. Virginia Hot Springs Co., 213 Fed. 969 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914), rcv'g 209
Fed. 979 (W. D. Va. 1913). The court in the earlier case discounts the argument that
inasmuch as the matter as to whether room exists is peculiarly within the knowledge of
the innkeeper, the burden of establishing that there was no room should he on him. But
on appeal the burden was put where it logically belongs, on the proprietor of the houze.
32. Browne v. Brandt [19021 1 K. B. 696; BrEAL, nm s ,mm Horas (1905)
§ 91.
33. One writer suggests that the strength or weakness of an applicant, and his ability
to get accommodation elsewhere ought to be considered. V; Zmr, B= .aTxs A,. Cr-
mzRs (2d ed. 1908) § 344 (1). Such considerations may prompt charity, but would not
seem to create additional legal duties. In Browne v. Brandt [19021 1 K. B. 696, while
there were no storms, plaintiff had been stranded on a road when his auto broke down.
19381
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Reservations in advance of arrival may be refused.3 4 But it has been said
that when a room has been reserved by an absent guest, so long as it remains
unoccupied an applicant has the right to its use. However, at a reasonable
time prior to the arrival of the person who made the reservation, the hotel
proprietor may resume possession in order to put the room in readiness for
him.3 5
Condition of Applicant
Inasmuch as the relationship between host and guest is not contractual but
consensual, 36 mere inability of the applicant to contract is no grounds for
denying him the use and service of the house. Prior to the enabling acts,
married women, though without legal power to contract, could demand admis-
sion. Similarly, infancy 7 alone is no ground for rejection. Rather, the special
need of women and persons of tender years would appear to buttress their right
to be served. Nor is an innkeeper excused for failure of his public service duty
by the fact that mental incompetency had rendered him powerless to contract.0 8
Before a traveler can insist on his right to accommodation, he must present
himself in a clean and decorous condition. So, a chimney sweeper in his soot,
covered working clothes can demand no rights in a hotelP A hostler may
It was impossible to get lodging elsewhere. Defendant's sleeping rooms were all occupied,
but there was other space in the house where plaintiff might have been allowed to sleep.
The proprietor refused to lodge him. The court justified him saying that the inn was full,
and to compel the admission of the plaintiff would be carrying the hotel keeper's duty
too far. Even a carrier has the right to prevent overcrowding and to designate the number
that will ride in any particular car. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 40
S. W. (2d) 356 (1931) (where seats of bus occupied, others may be excluded); see Com-
monwealth v. South Covington & CID. Street Ry., 181 Ky. 459, 465, 205 S. W. 581, 583
(1918). But see De Glopper v. Nashville Ry. & Light Co., 123 Tenn. 633, 647, 134 S. W.
609, 613 (1911) (though car crowded, if there is room and passenger is willing to ride,
carrier must accept him). Further, at common law, the ordinary carrier is under no obli-
gation to provide additional facilities as the demand for transportation increases. But, rail-
roads, operating under special franchises, are subject to extraordinary duties. They must
expand their facilities to adequately meet the growing demands of a community. An extra-
ordinary demand for transport is no excuse for failure to carry, if a railroad reasonably
ought to have forseen it. Ocean S. S. Co. of Savanah Locomotive Works & Supply Co.,
131 Ga. 831, 63 S. E. 577 (1909); see Louisville & N. R. R. v. Railroad Commissioners,
63 Fla. 491, 506, 58 So. 543, 548 (1912).
34. See Rothfield v. North British Railway Co., [19201 Sess. Cas. 805, 819.
35. See Medwar v. Grand Hotel Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 11, 25.
36. See Gastenhofer v. Clair, 10 Daly 265, 267 (N. Y. 1881); BEALE, INNxE'ERs AND
HOTELS (1906) § 111. The necessity of the consent of a hotelkeeper for becoming a guest
is seen from the fact that a person who occupies a room without registering or notifying
the management is not a guest. Thus, where a man, to the ignorance of the proprietor,
roomed with a woman who was in fact his wife, he could have no recovery for the dis-
courteous imputations of the hotel employees. A hotel owes m legal duty of courtesy only
to its guests. Warren v. Penn-Harris Hotel Co., 91 Pa. Super. 195 (1927).
37. Watson v. Gross, 2 Duv. 147 (Ky. 1865); SHOULER, BAni%1EXTS AND CAMnUERS
(1897) § 318.
38. 1 WymAiw, PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. (1911) § 340.
39. Pidgeon v. Legge, 5 W. R. 649, 21 3. P. 743 (1857); see State v. Steele, 106 N. C.
766, 776, 11 S. E. 478, 482 (1890).
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exclude from his premises applicants whose filthy condition would normally
disturb the comfort of other patrons. 0 Considering that annoyance to others
is the justification for rejection, it would seem that an applicant willing to
remove himself from the public parts of a hotel ought to be admitted.4 1
Indecency of costume strips an applicant of the right to insist on accommoda-
tions, but dress which is unconventional is no disqualification. Therefore, a
woman in cycling "shorts" cannot be denied service if the garb is within the
bounds of decency. She may, however, like coatless mens 2 be excluded from
the main dining hall and assigned to take her meals at a separate part of
the inn.43
Except for an old English case" where it is implied that a traveler can
demand to be admited though he be suffering from small-pox, the innkeeper
is generally conceded the right to reject as a guest one who ails with a con-
tagious disease.45 Considering the liability of a hostler who negligently exposes
to infection the patrons of his house,4 6 his right to exclude those suffering from
a communicable sickness is undeniable. A physical condition, though not con-
40. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 529, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837). Travelers
may be refused transportation on common carriers for the same reason. Pullman Co. v.
Krauss, 145 Ala. 395, 40 So. 398 (1906).
41. Assume that while driving at night, a traveler developed mechanical trouble in
his auto. In an unsuccessful attempt to repair the defect, his person and clothes were co
coated with grease and dust that his presence would be objectionable. But remaining
within his hotel room for the night would bring him in the sight of no one, so that hi
condition could hardly justify his exclusion. It is submitted that the innkeep-r could not
reject him even if at the time he applies there are patrons present. So long as he promizse
to keep out of the public rooms, his transitory appearance before others while reaching
his chamber, can offend only the squeamish. Surely the necessities of the traveling public
are superior to the over-delicate sensibilities of other guests.
42. Conceding that this separation was lawful it might be inquired whether a coatless
man could be denied admission to a dining hall if no other dining facilities were offered
him. Such dress would be me'ely unconventional, and if clean cannot extinguish his right
to be served. Further, the wearing of an insignia cannot be grounds for refusing to admit.
Cf. South Florida R. R. v. Rhoads, 25 Fla. 40, 5 So. 633 (18S9).
43. Regina v. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 (1899). Wvr, CsEs on Punric SinvicE Co.
(1909) 232. The mere shape of the dress is no grounds for exclusion. The New York Court
of Appeals, in a recent case, announced that to be within the limits of decency one is
not obliged to wear "ordinary street attire." Many costumes, while unusual and ludicrous,
are perfectly decent. "When it comes to the kind and sufficiency of clothes one must
wear to appear decently in public, we of the law have generally left such matters to the
good sense and force of public opinion." People v. O'Gorman, 274 N. Y. 284, 8 N. E.
(fd) 862 (1937).
44. Rex v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445, SS Eng. Reprint 1441 (K. B. 1701). It has been said
that the English common law forbade exclusion of those infected with contagion. 18 HAs-
BuRY's LAws or ENGLAND (1935) § 203.
45. See Jackson v. Virginia Hot Springs Co., 213 Fed. 969, 973 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914);
VAx Zrr, BAr.mErs Zm CAMIMS (2d ed. 1908) § 344(3). In an action for refusl to
admit it would not be necessary to allege sound health. Jackson v. Virginia Hot Springs
Co., supra, at 973. But if the issue of health is raised by the defense, the burden of proving
good health is on the rejected applicant. Brmn, Lcx=PERas AD Horn. (1905) § 101.
46. Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N. W. 632 (1835).
1938]
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tagious, may render the sufferer so loathsome in appearance that his exclusion
would be proper 47 Even where a sickness is neither infectious nor loathsome,
the keeper of an inn may deny admission to an applicant who would require
more than ordinary attention.48 So, one who is blind,4 9 crippled,50 or harm-
lessly insane, and unattended, may be excluded unless in spite of these afflic-
tions he requires no more care than ordinary guests.51 An innkeeper need not
convert his house into a hospital, nor make nurses of his aides.
Insanity alone does not disfranchise a traveler of his right to shelter and
service. However, where the condition creates reasonable fears for the safety
or comfort of the other guests rejection is permissible." Likewise the right is
not forfeited by intoxication,53 except that where drunkenness has translated
itself into violence which would endanger patrons, or into annoying boisterous-
ness, 5 4 or incompetency to care for oneself, 5 a host may refuse to open his doors.
Restriction of Inn to Particular Class
A hotel keeper is under no compulsion to proffer all grades of accommoda-
tions.5 6 It is within his sole right to determine whether his house will be
luxurious, bourgeois, or poor. Stemming from this right, and within his prerog-
ative to charge reasonable prices for the services offered, a proprietor may fix
the grade of his inn so high as to exclude all but the wealthy.57 Beyond this,
it is doubtful that he can restrict his house to a certain class, and the sug-
gestion that a hostler may confine his services to such persons as come with
vehicles 8 has been criticized as unsound. A proprietor may limit the use
of his inn to members of one sex, or to soldiers and sailors, so that the exclusion
of males or civilians would be justified.60
47. In Connors v. Cunard S. S. Co., 204 Mass. 310, 90 N. E. 601 (1910) plaintiff
rested her right to admission on the fact that her illness was not contagious and was
internal 'and not repulsive to others.
48. Cf. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Allen, 121 Ky. 138, 89 S. W. 150 (1905); Croom v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., SZ Minn. 296, 53 N. W. 1128 (1893) (carrier, public
servant like innkeeper, held not bound to 'receive for transport those requiring special care).
49. Cf. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Derry, 47 Colo. 584, 108 Pac. 172 (1910) (carrier);
Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Allen, 121 Ky. 138, 89 S. W. 150 (1905) (carrier).
50. See Hogan v. Nashville Interurban Ry., 131 Tenn. 244, 249, 174 S. W. 1118, 1119
(1915) (carrier).
51. Cf. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Smith, 85 Miss. 349, 37 So. 643 (1905) (blind);
Hogan v. Nashville Interurban R. R., 131 Tenn. 244, 174 S. W. 1118 (1915) (crippled).
52. Cf. Owens v. Macon R. R., 119 Ga., 230, 46 S. E. 87 (1903) (carrier).
53. Cf. Paris & G. N. Ry. v. Robinson, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 114 S. W. 658 (1908).
See Pittsburg, Cin. & St. L. Ry. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576, 579, 26 Am. Rep. 68, 70 (1879).
54. See State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 776, 11 S. E. 478, 482 (1890); Makham v.
Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 529, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837).
55. Cf. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Gatewood, 155 Ky. 102, 159 S. W. 660 (1913).
56. See De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397, 401, 86 N. E. 527, 529 (1908).
57. BEAIE, INNxEEPERS AND HOTELS (1906) § 65.
58. See Johnson v. Midland Ry., 4 Exch. 367, 371, 154 Eng. Reprint 1254, 1256
(1849). It was here intimated that a man may keep an inn exclusively for those who
come in their own carriage.
59. BEALE, IbNxxEPERs AND HOrnLS (1906) § 65.
60. See Rothfield v. North British Ry. [19201 Sess. Cas. 805, 812.
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Disorderly Application
The application for admission must be peaceable and gentlemanlyP If a
traveler enters an inn by breaking down the door, he may be refused shelter. 2
Vulgar, abusive language is a disqualification, but the mere expression "be
damned to you", in answer to provoking personal inquiries is not such miscon-
duct as to warrant a denial of entrance.03
In an early dictum it was suggested that an applicant was not bound to
reveal his name and address as a condition for admission.0 4 However, the
common law right of a hotelkeeper, in managing his business, to keep a register
and exclude those who refuse to give their names seems incontrovertible and
has been judicially recognized.05 Legislation in some jurisdictions has prescribed
punishment for those who register under assumed names.00 Some states have
made the maintenance of registers compulsory 7 and prohibit the acceptance of
a traveler who refuses to disclose his name and place of residence.cs When a
couple present themselves for a room, it seems within the innkeeper's right to
demand a disclosure of their relationship and status. To prevent his house
from use as a resort for immorality, he has the right to require evidence of
marriage before allowing a man and woman to room together0 0 A rule exclud-
ing persons without baggage unless they identify themselves is reasonable. So,
the rejection of a husband and wife who carried no baggage and failed to
identify themselves is a legitimate exclusion. °
Nature of Baggage
The exceptional nature of the baggage carried by a traveler may warrant
his rejection.71 A tiger, a large dog, a scientist's tubes of germs are such poten-
61. Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 (N. Y. 1303); Rex v. Ivens 7 C. & P. 213,
173 Eng. Reprints 94 (N. P. 135); see Hawthorne v. Hammond, 1 Car. & K. 404, 407,
174 Eng. Reprints 866, 869 (1844).
62. Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 (N. Y. 180S).
63. Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213, 173 Eng. Reprint 94 (N. P. 1835).
64. Id., at 219, 173 Eng. Reprints at 97.
65. Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 103 S. E. 309 (1921). Failure to
register does not deprive one of status of guest, where he was permitted to occupy the
-room. Moody v. Kenny, 153 La. 1007, 97 So. 21 (1923); Hill v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124
Tenn. 376, 136 S. W. 997 (1911); Fisher v. Bonnevile Hotel Co., S5 Utah 589, 183 Pac.
856 (1920).
66. MAss. ANNx. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 140, § 29; MIss. CoDE Ann. (1930)
§ 5111 (gives innkeeper right to eject those registered under assumed name); N. C. CoDE
Amv. (1935) § 2283 (v); N. D. Co . LAWS AhN-. (Supp. 1925) § 10253al, 2; Omo Gi!.
CODE (Page, 1926) § 843-1a; VT. PuB. L4.,ws (1933) § 8190.
67. ALkss. Az x. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 140, § 27; N. Y. ELrno:no LA,"
(1936) § 61; VTT. PUB. LAWS (1933) § 8189.
6S. L-Ass. A.xN-. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 140, § 27; N. C. CODn (1935)
§ 2233 (v) (guest must register, if register kept); Vr. Purn. LAwS (1933) § 8190 (appli-
cant must register).
69. A couple falsely representing themselves as husband and wife are guilty of a
misdemeanor in some states. N. C. CODE (1935) § 4345.
70. Coquelet v. Union Hotel Co. of Baltimore City, 139 Md. 544, 115 Ati. 813 (1921).
71. As a rule, the hotelkeeper must receive both the guest and his luggage. Robbins &
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tial sources of injury to person and property that their exclusion is a safety
measure which must be approved. Likewise, no guest can complain for being
refused admission if he insists on bringing with him a package of dynamite or
a container of poison gas.72 Non-dangerous, but obnoxious property, may also
be kept out. Thus, fertilizer exuding fetid odors, and loud barking dogs,
whose wails would discommode the patrons of the house, need not be admitted
by an innkeeper. 73 As to dogs, it has been intimated that a guest could never
insist on bringing them into the public rooms of a hotel.74 But, where a
traveler comes with a dog, and the hostler refuses to shelter it in an outhouse,
and there is nothing that could make it a cause of alarm or offense to others,
the guest may be justified in bringing the animal to his room.75 There is a
class of property including musical instruments which, if abused, can become
a nuisance, but the use of which can be regulated by the innkeeper so as to
safeguard his patrons' comfort. Such luggage a guest may bring in with him.1 0
No Right to Particular Room
A guest has no right to any particular room.7 7 However, the innkeeper's
right to select the room must be distinguished from the right to dictate the
grade of accommodations. 78 Suppose there are available rooms of two types,
one for $3 and the other for $6. The host cannot arbitrarily assign the guest
to a $6 room if the cheaper one is requested. Yet this form of discrimination
is practised and its justification attempted in the name of the right to assign.70
Because a guest is not entitled to the room of his choice, the innkeeper can
so assign apartments as to effect a segregation of one sex from the other; 80
of persons in formal attire from those in street clothes; 81 of negroes from
white persons.8
2
Co. v. Gray, [18951 2 Q. B. 501. See L. E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 754,
60 S. W. (2d) 32, 34 (1933). Baggage is not limited to such articles as are ordinarily used
by travelers stopping at hotels. Zeiger v. Woodson, 202 S. W. 163 (Tex. 1918).
72. See Robins & Co. v. Gray [1895) 2 Q. B. 501, 504.
73. See Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 140 (1877) (property annoying to others
may be excluded).
74. See Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 141 (1877).
75. See Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 140 (1877).
76. See Threfall v. Borwick, L. R. 10 Q. B. 210, 212 (1875). BEALE, INNXEEPRS AND
HoTEs (1906) § 68.
77. Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 151 Eng. Reprint 1039 (Ex. 1841); Regina v.
Sprague,'63 J. P. 233 (1899), WYMAN, CAsEs ON PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (1909) 232; see Do-
Wolf v. For-d, 193 N. Y. 397, 402, 86 N. E. 527, 529 (1908).
78. By statute in New York a hotel keeper must conspicuously post a statement of the
rates for lodging by the day and for food. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LA W (1909) § 206.
79. By maintaining an elaborate, expensive suite, and making it the only one available
to persons he would exclude, an innkeeper could, in so far as a large body of the public
is concerned, effectively evade the duty to serve, and arm himself with discriminatory
powers. The law would give travelers little protection, if it sanctioned such conduct.
80. Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 181 App. Div. 61, 168 N. Y. Supp. 191 (2d
Dep't 1917), aff'd, 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647 (1920).
81. Regina v. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 (1899), WXYMAN, CASES ON PUBLIC SERVICE Co. (1909)
232.
82. 1 WYMrAN, PUBLIC SERWCE CORPORATIONS (1911) § 566.
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Civil Rights
At the common law no one could be excluded from a hotel solely because of
his race, color, or creed.8 3 By professing to serve the public, the innkeeper in-
vested everyone with a common right to use his inn. The essence of a common
right is equality and equality precludes discrimination. It is undeniable that
pecuniary hardships will be sustained by a hotel proprietor compelled to admit
persons of a color or race against which prejudices are current in the com-
munity.8 4 One southern court, sensing these hardships, was so impressed as to
announce in dictum that a hotel keeper could deny accommodations to persons
whose race made them so objectionable to the patrons of his inn that it would
injure his business to admit them.85 This dictum is unsound and discrimination
is unlawful, regardless of the effect on the proprietor's business. 0 Segregation,
however, has been sanctioned.8 7 So long as substantially equal accommodations
are given, the mere separation of the races constitutes no discrimination. But
if the rooms quartering one race are furnished with clean bedding and with
washing facilities, while these conveniences are absent from the parts occupied
by the other race, separation would be unlawfuP s
Following the Civil War, the agitation for the abolition of color and race
discriminations was consummated in the enactment of a civil rights statute
by the Federal Congress.8 9 Although this perished of unconstitutionality20 it
stimulated and moulded country wide legislation 0 ' on the subject. The new
33. Rothfield v. North British Ry. [1920] Sess. Cas. 805 (fact that applicant vas
Jewish no excuse for rejecting); see Charge to Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
18,25S, at 1000 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1875); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 41 (1883)
(dssent by Harlan, J.); Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 96, 123 N. W. 231, 233
(1909); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Alich. 358, 365, 46 N. W. 713, 720 (1390); West Chester &
P. R. R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 211 (1867); 1 WymAw, Pu Bic S.nvicE Conranno:.s (1911)
§ 565.
34. 1 WyM-A, PuBiac SF.viCE Co.n'oaiO ,Os (1911) § 565.
35. See State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 782, 11 S. E. 478, 434 (1890).
86. Baaax, L'=-EEEPERs AmI HoTEIs (1906) §§ 65, 92.
37 Regina v. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 (1899), WYmiAN, CAsEs o.. PunrLc SEnvicn Co.
(1909) 232; 1 WY Ax, PuBrc SEancE CoPoRA'iONs (1911) § 566; BLUXn, Ixxiu.zanS
Am HoTELs (1906) § 56. The same right of segregation was recognized in common car-
riers, also under duty to serve all equally. Chiles v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 213 U. S.
71 (1910); West Chester & Philadelphia R. R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1367).
8S. Cf. The Sue, 22 Fed. S43 (D. Maryland 1885). Unless the respective accommoda-
tions were substantially equal, separation would be illegal. BEur.un, L' -xu~rps &;D Horaas
(1906) § 56.
39. The Federal Civil Rights Act, 13 STAT. 335 (1875).
90. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1383). In this celebrated decision the Supreme
Court denied that either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendments authorized Con-
gress to enact legislation defining the civil rights of individuals. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment abolished slavery, and while the court concedes that under it Congress could pass
laws to obliterate servitude, it ridicules the suggestion that denial of admission to a hotel
is slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited discriminatory legislation by the states,
and empowered Congress to pass laws to nullify such legislation. But this Civil Rights
Act was not corrective. It was of an original, character, hence void.
91. I . REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 125; Ian. STAY. Azmn. (Burnms, 1933)
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statutes ordered equality of treatment not only at hotels, but in theatres and
other places of public amusement, 92 and one of their major effects was to
banish segregation. Where an act provides that all persons, regardless of race
or color, shall be entitled to equal accommodations, and the New York statute
so orders,93 it is violated if the patrons are separated according to racial or
color lines. 94
Character and Reputation
The decisioas abound in dicta giving an innkeeper the right to refuse ac-
commodations to one whose character or reputation is bad. A rule so broadly
expressed is of little practical value. Can it be that any fault of character will
disqualify a traveler from his right to admission? In Nelson v. Boldt,95 the
rejected applicant was a professional prizefighter at a time when boxing was
illegal. While the court implies that something more than mere law-breaking 0
is required to warrant exclusion, it makes no disclosure of additional considera-
tions. In the Scottish case of Rothfield v. The North British Railway,"7 a
money-lender, whose business practises had been publicly attacked, was refused
accommodations. The court justified the innkeeper on the grounds that the
presence of such a person at the hotel would have been disagreeable to the other
patrons and prejudicial to the house. This test is unsound. Neither loss of
patronage, nor mere "disagreeableness" to the other guests,0 8 has ever been
§ 10-901; IOWA Coo (1935) § 13251; KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 21, § 2424; Mg.
REv. STAT. (1930) c. 134, §§ 7, 10 (publications calculated to produce discrimination pro-
hibited); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 272, § 98; MnN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 7321; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 171, § 3 (publications calculated to produce dis-
crinination prohibited); N. J. Comp. STAT. (1911) tit. Civil Rights, § 1; Ouo GEN. CooE
(Page, 1926) § 12940; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tLit. 18, § 1211; R. I. GEN. LAWS
(1923) § 6040; WASH. R v. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2686; N. Y. CmvL RIonST LAW
(1935) § 40; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 340.75.
92. The constitutionality of these laws, insofar as hotels were concerned, is obvious,
since they merely iterate the common law. See Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89,
96, 123 N. W. 231, 233 (1909); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 365, 46 N. W. 718, 720
(1890). Yet their validity was -affirmed even as to other places. Western Turf Ass'n v.
Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 (1907) (race-course); Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 12 Am,
Reports 375 (1873) (theatre); People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418 (f888) (skating rink).
93. "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public ac-
commodations, resort or amusements .... " N. Y. CIVi RxronTs LAW § 40.
94. Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 55 (1920); Baylies v. Curry, 128 111.
287, 21 N. E. 595 (1889); Fruchey v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N. E. 146 (1896); Fer-
guson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N. W. 718 (1890).
95. 180 Fed. 779 (E. D. Pa. 1910). The case has been criticised in (1911) 24 HAav,
L. REv. 239.
96. Mere previous law-breaking should be no proper cause for exclusion. See 1 WXymAn,
PUBLmc SERvc CORP. (1911) § 611.
97. [1920J Sess. Cas. 805.
98. See (1911) 24 HARv. L. RE.. 239. It is there set down that " . .. the mere in.
terest of the public servant should be no excuse .... Engaged in a public undertaking, the
innkeeper can justify his failure to perform it only on grounds in which the public is
interested."
[Vol. 7
COMMENTS
sufficient to justify exclusion. However, under such a rule it would be per-
missable to deny entrance to a gangster whose notorious affiliations with cor-
ruption would make him unwelcome in decent society.
In defining the character and reputation that warrant rejection at a hotel,
it will be helpful, because of the analogous liabilities of these occupations, to
note the corresponding right which justifies a carrier in refusing to transport a
traveler. 99 It is held that the private character of the traveler is no concern of
the carrier, unless it will affect his conduct on the train. No matter how in-
famous a person is, if his public demeanor is respectable, he must be given
transport. Thus, a known prostitute cannot be denied carriage when her be-
havior in public is unimpeachable.'0 0 Such a rule can well be incorporated
into the law of hotels.101 True, an innkeeper may keep out one who would
bring discomfort to his guests. But the presence of a person, known to be pri-
vately immoral, yet acting decorously, can disturb only the fastidious, and
the necessities of the traveling public must be protected before these nice
sensibilities.' 0 2 It is submitted that the presence of a bad character brings
no direct physical discomfort, but offends only the moral sense. An advocate
of euthanasia would hardly be less offensive, yet who would deny his right to
accommodation at a hotel?103 Private virtue cannot be made a condition prece-
dent to admission. But the inveterate thief, who probably will purloin the
goods of host and fellow guests can rightfully be denied admission; 10 similarly,
a woman of such immoral nature that misconduct in the hotel is reasonably
expected, cannot complain if refused accommodation. Obviously, one who in-
tends objectionable conduct forfeits his right to enter.'Lo
99. It might appear that the relation between guests at a hotel is so much do-er than
that between fellow-passengers on a train, that the admission of a disreputable parsen on
a carrier is no argument for his admission to an inn. However, travelers on a tranzcontinental
rail trip live for several days under the same roof, dine at the same table, and experience
an intimacy so similar to that of hotel guests, that the analogy is sound.
100. Brown v. Memphis & C. R. R., 7 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 6th, 1831). Unle s one has
such-a tendency toward an offensive vice, that, if permitted to remain, he will put it in
action and disturb passengers, he cannot be excluded. The telephone company, though
a public servant like an innkeeper, cannot refuse telephone service to a woman engaged in
an immoral business. If the house wherein the service is required is reputable, the col-
]ateral immoral enterprises of the woman are no concern of the telephone company.
Goodwin v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 136 N. C. 258, 4S S. E. 636 (1904).
101. " ...it is incorrect to say as is incautiously said that one may be rejected by
reason of his evil reputation. Where the past misconduct has no relation to the prezent
service, there certainly can be no refusal. Mere past conduct, as such, cannot justify refus!."
1 WyzAx, PuBric SEmvicE CoanoRAnozs (1911) § 642. But see Raider v. Dixie Inn, 193
Ky. 152, 154, 248 S. W. 229 (1923); State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 782, 11 S. E. 473, 434
(1390); Watkins v. Cope, 84 N. J. L. 143, 143, 86 At. 545, 543 (Sup. CL 1913); Roth-
field v. The North British Ry., [1920] Sess. Cas. 805, 811.
102. See (1911) 24 HAsv. L. REV. 239.
103. A non-union laborer, against whom there is popular wrath, cannot be refused
transport on a train. Chicago & A. R. R. v. Pillsbury, 8 N. E. E03 (II. 1S36).
104. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 528, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210; Wathins v.
Cope, 84 N. 3. L. 143, 148, 86 At. 545, 54S (Sup. Ct. 1913).
105. BFktiE LNKEEPERs Aim HOTErS (1906) § 136. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H.
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The doctrine of probable cause seems to pervade all of the excuses for re-
jection.100 It would be harsh to say that since no proper applicant can be
refused, the innkeeper acts at his peril. So long as it reasonably appears that,
for example, the guest has a contagious disease,'0 7 or is intoxicated, exclusion
is justified, even though in fact the objectionable condition did not exist.108
More than mere suspicion is required. Thus, where a group of militiamen had
been ejected for disorderly conduct, an innkeeper was not justified in excluding
an independant member of the same company. His fear that disorder was to
be expected from anyone wearing the uniform of that company was held un-
reasonable.10 9
Non-Guests
Business invitees of a guest must be admitted, unless their entry would
violate a proper rule of the house." 0 Certainly, if a hotel forbids women
from having male visitors in their rooms, this would also exclude business men.
While social invtees have sometimes been given the same right, "I it is the
more general rule that they enter only under an implied license, revocable at
will by the proprietor." 2 Their admission is permissive rather than of right.
And clearly, one who has not been invited and who comes for a social visit
may be kept out." 3
The rule that the innkeeper must admit all is restricted to those who offer
themselves as guests." 4 A guest is one who comes to receive the customary
lodging or entertainment of the hotel." 0  One who comes not as a guest, nor
523, 529, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837); Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 8, 22 N. W. 825, 827
(1885); State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 778, 11 S. E. 478, 482 (soliciting from patrons re-
garded as annoying, and those who come with intent to solicit may be excluded).
106. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837); 1 WYMAN,
Punmc SEavica Co~puoRA roNs (1911) §§ 643, 645.
107. Cf. Paddock v. Atchison, T. &. S. F. R. R., 37 Fed. 841 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1889).
108. See Connors v. Cunard S. S. Co., 204 Mass. 310, 316, 90 N. E. 601, 603 (1910).
In Regner v. Glens Falls R. R., 74 Hun. 202, 26 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1893) one
suffering from St. Vitus disease exhibited movements which, to the conductor of the
train, appeared to be the actions of an inebriate. He proceeded to eject, and the carrier is
held liable. This case would not seem to disturb the doctline that a public servant may
act on probable cause. This conductor acted rashly, not on probable cause.
109. Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 538, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884).
110. See Goldstein v. Healy, 187 Cal. 206, 210, 201 Pac. 462, 464 (1921); Markham
v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 529, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 211 (1837) (it is evdn the opinion of this
court that if one dispenses a service appropriate to travelers as such he may enter though
not invited). It has been said that guest has right, not merely ptivilege, to invite persons,
and this right is one of the accommodations given by a hotel to its patrons. Goldstein v.
Healy, supra.
111. BEALE, I-NKEaPERS AND HOTELS (1906) § 84.
112. Money v. Travelers' Hotel Co., 174 N. C. 508, 93 S. E. 964 (1917).
113. BEALE, -NXE.FPERs AND HoTrs (1906) § 84.
114. See Gordon v. Silber, 25 Q. B. D. 491, 492 (1890).
115. Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52 (1863); Atcade Hotel Co. v. Wyatt, 44 Ohio 32,
4 N. E. 398 (1886); Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. 825 (1885); see In re
Doubleday, 173 App. Div. 739, 743, 159 N. Y. Supp. 947, 950 (3d Dep't 1916). One who
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at the request of a guest, but out of curiosity or cupidity for profit to be de-
rived from mingling with the patrons, cannot invoke the hotel keeper's com-
pulsory duty to admit applicants.11 Although a person coming on his own
business, uninvited by a guest, may be refused admission,"17 if he trades in a
service appropriate to travelers as such, for example transportation, it is un-
lawful for the innkeeper to exclude him and admit his rival." 8 But where a
collateral business like a barber-shop, a news-stand, or a laundry is operated
by the proprietor himself, or its exclusive rights have been given to another
for a per centum return, the innkeeper may rightfully refuse to admit com-
petitors." 9 So long as the hotel proprietor is financially interested in this col-
lateral service, competitors may be refused admission even though they come
at the request of a guest, and their exclusion will tend to create a monopoly.2 o
EJECTION
Loss of Status as Traveler
When a person ceases to be a traveler, or transient, and takes up a per-
manent abode, even at an inn, he ceases to be an object of the ]aw's special
solicitude. He is no longer a guest, but a boarder; no longer a traveler, but
a resident,121 and subject to ejection. Length of stay though significant does
intends to use the room for a purpose of business distinct from his accommodation as a
guest may be denied admision. 2 Kr-im-'s Co=nr. 596. Thus an innkeeper is not bound
to furnish a guest with 'rooms for displaying merchandise. See Burges v. Clements,
4 Al. & S. 306, 310, 105 Eng. Reprints 4S, 849 (K. B. 1315). Similarly, one who comes
to decoy away patrons to another inn has no legal right to admission, for he does not
come as guest. Jencks v. Coleman, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7, 258, at 444 (C. C. D. R. L 1835).
Diverting travelers from one hotel to another by false representations and for the purpoce
of gain is a misdemeanor. N. Y. PrF.AL Lver (1932) § 925-a.
116. State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478 (1890). While a non-guest sometimes
enters as of right, it is never in his own right, but only under the right of a guest to
)receive business visitors.
117. See id. at 782, 11 S. E. at 484.
11S. Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837).
119. State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478 (1890).
120. Champie v. Castle Hot Springs Co., 27 Ariz. 463, 233 Pac. 1107 (1925).
121. Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass. 1351); Homer v. Harvey,
3 N. M. 307, 5 Pac. 329 (1885); McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Ore. 307, 10 Pac. 593 (1919).
Rooms were occupied under a written agreement stipulating a term of six months and for
a weekly "rental". The court properly finds that the contract contemplated the relation
of landlord and tenant. Hackett N. Bell Operating Co., Inc., 181 App. Div. 535, 169
N. Y. Supp. 114 (1st Dep't 1918). In another New York case, a laborer working in the
city and regarding the city as his residence, took rooms at a hotel, and after remaining
approximately two months, lost some articles. He was held a guest, the court stresng
his failure to bring furniture with him. Both the length of stay and the fact that the
city was his residence show a permanence which seem to make him a boarder in a
furnished room, tather than a guest.
n some states, the length of time during which a patron remains a transient is fied
by statute. N. C. Cone (1935) § 22S3 (a) (one week); S. C. CODE (1932) § 5097 (one
week).
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not automatically effect a change in status.12 2 In the celebrated case of Han-
cock v. Rand,123 General Hancock and his family had entered the hotel in No-
vember with an understanding that they would remain until the following
summer, unless the general was ordered elsewhere sooner on military duty.
For seven months they made their residence at this inn, and in an action for
goods lost it was held that the general and his family were still guests. Ac-
cording to this case officers of the army and navy, who have no permanent
residence which they can call home, may- well be regarded as travelers though
their stay is prolonged. They are essentially transients subject to change by
their superiors at any moment. Similar liberality was shown to a legislator
and his family, who had taken quarters in a hotel at the capital city during
the session.' 24  Generalizing on these cases, it would seem that where the
duration of the stay is subject to the volition of the guest a prolonged residence
converts him into a lodger. Where the time of stay is subject to contingencies
out of his control and which may occur at any moment, and the innkeeper
has notice of it, the status of guest continues though the residence is prolonged.
Method of payment is another circumstance to be considered in determining
whether an inmate at a hotel is a guest or a boarder. The fact that the hotel
charges are paid at a fixed rate per week or month does not necessarily break
the host-guest relation. 25 In some cases little importance is attached to the
question whether the fixed rate per week or month is in pursuance of an agree-
ment to remain for a definite period.128 Other courts, in declaring that such
payment does not strip a patron of his character as guest, have labored to em-
phasize the absence of a contract to remain for a definite time.127 The fixity of
the time of stay should hardly brand one a boarder, if the stipulated period is
short and shows transiency.
122. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); 18 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENO.LAND (2d
ed. 1935) § 201. There may be circumstances, such as illness, where a person's status as
a traveler survives a prolonged stay. See Lamond v. Richard, [1897] 1 Q. B. 541, 546.
123. 94 N. Y. 1 (1883).
124. Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 Pac. 856 (1920) (held guest
though intent was to remain for duration of session).
In any case, even if a prolonged residence is intended, the innkeeper-guest relation may
be created by special contract to that effect. Baldwin Piano Co. v. Congress Hotel, 243
Ill. App. 118 (1928).
125. Pettit v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912); Berkshire Woollen Co. v.
Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass. 1851); Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); Polk & Co. v.
Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N. W. 867 (1904). In fact the presumption that one
who enters as a traveler retains that status is not even rebutted by proof that he paid
fixed weekly or monthly rates, and that these were lower than the rates charged to
transients. Luske v. Relote, 22 Minn. 468 (1878). A situation of this sort ought to be
closely scrutinized, for the great probability is that the rates were lowered in consideation
for a more prolonged stay, the effect of which would be to change a patron from a guest
to a boarder.
126. Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Metzger v.
Schnabel, 23 Misc. 698, 52 N. Y. Supp. 105 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
127. Holstein v. Phillips, 146 N. C. 366, 59 S. E. 1037 (1907). In Hancock v. Rand,
94 N. Y. 1, 6 (1883), considerable emphasis is put on the absence of an absolute
contract as to time.
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Failure to Pay, Appearance, and Manners
A guest who refuses or is unable to pay the reasonable charges of the inn-
keeper may be rightfully put out. - Likewise, public appearances in a filthy
condition or in immodest dress works a forfeiture of a patron's right to remain.
Small breaches of etiquette do not warrant ejection. One reaching across a
table for food may be disagreeable, but he cannot be put out.Y-O Those who are
being served with the general public cannot be too fastidious.
Breach of Reasonable Regulations
The internal management of the hotel is within the control of the proprietor.
He may promulgate and enforce reasonable regulations governing the conduct
of his patrons and the infraction of these rules by a guest subjects him tc
removal. 130 Any rule is reasonable which tends to prevent immorality or
misconduct that may be offensive to other inmates. Thus a prohibition against
women entertaining men visitors privately has been held proper.'
3
'
Disease
A guest who contracts a contagious disease can be removed. This removal
must be effected with due regard to the guest's condition. 13 2 For default in
care, the offending host is liable in damages. Thus, where the ejected guest
was, to the knowledge of the proprietor, so infirm as to be unable to walk or
stand, and he fell into a stream of snow and water on a cold night, recovery
for his death from exposure was allowed against the innkeeper.233
Misconduct
Improper behavior134 is the most frequent cause for the ejection of guests.
Where their conduct is illegal, dangerous, or calculated to disturb the comfort
of others, they have forfeited their right to remain.135 Persons using the inn
128. Moimingstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 211 N. Y. 465, 105 N. E. 6S6 (1914); fie
Raider v. Dixie Inn, 19S Ky. 152, 153, 243 S. W. 229, (1923).
129. 1 W".rAx, PuBuc SERvic CoRP. (1911) § 555. But see Strathearn Hydropathic
Co. v. Inland Revenue, 8 R. 798, 80 (1881) where a hotel keepar isaid to have the
right to exclude persons "because their manners and habits, are not suitable to the CLass
of people whom he receives!'
130. State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478 (1890); cf. Texas Midland R.R. v.
Geraldon, 103 Tex. 402, 128 S. W. 611 (1910). An ejection, even though authorized mut
be reasonably executed.
131. Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co., 132 App. Div. 49, 169 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dep't 1913);
Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel, 181 App. Div. 61, 163 N. T% Supp. 191 (2d Dcp't 1917).
132. Levy v. Carey, 1 City Ct. Rep. Supp. 57 (N. Y. 1334).
133. McHugh v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. 430, 23 AtL 291 (1394).
134. The reception of an applicant as a guest engenders, in the legal eye, an agreement
that the hotel proprietor will use reasonable care for the safety and comfort of the guest,
and that the patron will refrain from offensive behavior. Lehnen v. E. J. Hines & Co.,
SS Kan. 58, 127 Pac. 612 (1912)..
135. Obviously a servant of the public will not be compelled to give cover to public
wrongs--crimes. And there is an impressive array of cases supporting the innkeep s
right to spare his patrons discomfort and molestation by ejecting the boisterous and the
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for gambling, conspiracies, prostitution'"3 or other criminal activities can be
put out. Rowdyism and clamorous intoxication, 137 as well as injuries to the
other patrons or to the property of the hotel render a guest removable. Nor
need an innkeeper wait for an act. It is sufficient if under the circumstances
the improper act is reasonably forseen as imminent. 138 An interesting question
is whether a guest who threatens to commit suicide may be put out. Such a
person has ceased to use the inn as a place for lodging and entertainment, and
the consequent loss of his status as guest divests him of the right to remain.
Moreover, self-destruction was a crime at common law' 39 and today is defined
by statute140 as a grave public wrong. No hotel proprietor should be under
compulsion to permit the use of his house for such offensive and essentially
immoral conduct.
Remedies
While an old English case' 41 speaks of compelling a delinquent innkeeper to
specifically perform his duties toward the public, modern authorities uniformly
restrict the person wrongfully excluded or ejected to an action for damages, 142
and in some states subject the offending host to criminal punishment. 43 In
actions for refusal to admit, the rejected applicant must establish his right to
enter, 144 but in suits based on ejection, the burden of justification is on the
insolent. Holden v. Catraher, 195 Mass. 392, 81 N. E. 261 (1907); Jones v. Shannon,
55 Mont. 225, 175 Pac. 882 (1918); Chase v. Knabel, 46 Wash. 484, 90 Pac. 642 (1907).
136. Not only was ejection sanctioned in one such case, but the innkeeper was allowed
to recover damages against the offending guest on the grounds that prostitution created a
private nuisance. Hall v. Galloway, 76 Wash. 42, 135 Pac. 478 (1913). But see Curtis
v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 8, 22 N. W. 825, 827 (1885) where the court said that once a
man had become a guest "he could not have been turned into the street, though his
profligate conduct was outraging all decency. . . ." This dictum cannot be supported.
137. McHugh v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. 480, 28 Aft. 291 (1894).
138. See Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209, 210 (1837).
139. 2 BIsHOP, CRTh!InAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 1187; see Shipman v. Protected Home
Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 406, 67 N. E. 83, 85 (1903).
140. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 2301.
141. "Innkeepers are compellable by the constable to lodge strangers ... " Newton v.
Trigg, 1 Show. 268, 269, 89 Eng. Reprints 566 (K. B. 1691).
142. Willis v. McMahan, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891) (exclusion); Dalzell v. Dean
Hotel Co., 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S. W. 41 (1916) (ejection); Cornell v. Huber, 102
App. Div. 293, 92 N. Y. Supp. 434 (2d Dep't 1905) (exclusion).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 126; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's
Co-op., 1933) c. 14, § 7; NEB. CouP. STAT. (1929) § 23-102; N. Y. PENAm LAW (1918)
§ 513; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. 103, c. 29, § 2. The criminality of an inn-
keeper's refusal to accept an applicant was established at common law. Rex v. Ivens,
7 C. & P. 213, 173 Eng. Reprints 94 (N. P. 1835); see Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221,
230, 52 Am. Dec. 303, 311 (1850); 1 BisHop, CpxmdA. LAW (1923) § 532.
144. 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. (1911) § 634. However, as to matters peculiarly
within the innkeeper's knowledge, plaintiff is relieved of the burden. Thus, where an
innkeeper defends the exclusion of an applicant on the grounds that his accommodations
were exhausted, the burden of proving this condition would seem, by authority and logic,
to be on him. See Jackson v. Virginia Hot Springs Co., 213 Fed. 969, 973 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914).
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hotel keeper. 145 Compensation for the injury is the measure of damages. 46
Recovery has been allowed for loss of health consequent upon the non-use of
mineral waters appurtenant to the hotel from which the plaintiff was ex-
cluded.1 47 A sick woman unlawfully removed from her apartment was awarded
damages for a miscarriage induced by this experience. 4 9 Mental distress and
injury to feelings resulting from humiliation are compensable,"19 even though
there is no accompanying physical harm.6 0 When an innkeeper "locks out"
a guest unlawfully, and a patron has belongings inside his room, is the hostler
liable for their conversion? It seems obvious that the innkeeper has no inten-
tion to deprive the owner of the goods. The paramount intent is to sever the
guest not from his belongings but from the room. Yet, by such behavior
wrongful possession of the goods is assumed, and unless the host tenders their
return, conversion can be made out. Where goods are detained by one who
has acquired possession unlawfully, demand by the owner is unnecessary to
work out conversion.' 6 '
Conclusion
In recent years some judges have intimated a desire to emancipate the inn-
keeper from this compulsion. The duty to admit guests would be limited by
them to cases of strict necessity, where an applicant is incapable of being
lodged elsewhere.152 No doubt these emanations are prompted by hard cases,
where proprietors have been confronted with applicants whose business or
nationality makes them odious in a prejudiced community, and whose admissioa
would cause the withdrawal of lucrative patronage. But the trend favors the
retention of this obligation, the desirability of which has been proven through
the many years of its existence. It has become obvious that the host's right to
protect his patrons from discomfort is his main premise for refusing incoming
guests and for ejecting objectionable inmates, Since every hotel is public, the
only annoyance and discomfort that can justify the exercise of this right is such
conduct as would reasonably annoy or discomfort an ordinary member of the
public. So, the extent of this power may well vary with a change in public
tastes and customs.
145. Dixon v. Hotel Tulwiter Operating Co., 214 Ala. 396, 103 So. 26 (1926); 1
Wvx-,A,, PuBuc SEnvicE CoRp. (1911) § 634.
146. Jones v. Shannon, 55 Mont. 225, 175 Pac. 882 (1918).
147. Willis v. Mcahan, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1391).
148. Dahell v. Dean Hotel Co., 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S. W. 41 (1916).
149. Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co.,'211 N. Y. 465, 105 N. E. 656 (1914).
150. Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N. E. 475 (1921). Contra: Dazdl v. Dean
Hotel Co., 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S. W. 41 (1916).
151. See HA a,, LAw or TORTS (1933) § 30.
152. See Rothfield v. North British Ry., [1920] Sess. Cas. 805, 828.
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